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Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and
Contemplation
Marc Gasser-Wingate
Part of the justification of the contemplative life Aristotle offers at EN X.6-8
rests on the claim that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous
activity. Virtuous activity of any sort, Aristotle tells us, will require some basic
necessities, but contemplation distinguishes itself by being an activity we can
perform without relying on others: the just or courageous individual needs other
people to be just or courageous towards, or just and courageous with, while the
philosopher can contemplate alone (X.7 1177a27-b1). Aristotle says that this
agrees with his previous arguments, and it’s natural to think, for reasons I’ll be
reviewing below, that he is referring here to his characterization of eudaimonia
as something self-sufficient, that is, something which “on its own makes life
choiceworthy and lacking in nothing” (I.7 1097b14).1
But as a number of commentators have pointed out, such an interpretation
makes Aristotle’s defense of the contemplative life rather problematic.2 For
there’s no immediate reason why the kind of self-sufficiency mentioned in I.7
would require that an individual engage in activities which do not rely on others.
After all, if our life is “lacking in nothing” then in particular it isn’t lacking
in contemplative colleagues, and so it’s not obvious why the fact that we can
contemplate alone would make us (or our contemplative activity) especially self-
sufficient.3 Now, it may be tempting to think that leading a frugal existence is
a good way to achieve self-sufficiency: perhaps the best way to make our lives
1In what follows I will be using eudaimonia, “happiness,” and “human flourishing” interchange-
ably. All of these should be taken to denote the highest human good.
2See for instance Brown’s notes to Ross (2009: 265), Kraut (1989: 299), Nussbaum (2001: 376),
and, more recently, Hitz (2011: 1–4).
3Nor indeed is it immediately clear how anything could be more or less self-sufficient in the
first place, since the definition of self-sufficiency in I.7 is an absolute—a candidate good (or set of
goods) is either self-sufficient or not, depending on whether or not it makes our lives choiceworthy
and lacking in nothing. To further complicate things, Aristotle ascribes self-sufficiency to both
individuals and activities (including eudaimonia), and also speaks of our natures and lives being
self-sufficient, and of the self-sufficiency of cities, and even of the self-sufficiency of certain types of
knowledge. More below on his many uses of the term, and how we might reconcile them.
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“lacking in nothing” is for us to minimize our needs, and engage only in pursuits
that require very little. But Aristotle doesn’t generally seem concerned with the
number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and tells us quite
explicitly that eudaimonia will require a lot: we need friends and fellow citizens
because we are by nature political (I.7 1097b11), we need at least enough luck
to avoid Priam’s wretched fate (I.8 1100a5-9), and we need a broad array of
external goods as prerequisites for different kinds of virtuous activity—money,
political power, health, honor, good birth, tolerable looks, decent children. If
eudaimonia can require all these resources and still be self-sufficient, it’s not
clear why contemplation’s being a low-resource activity would contribute to its
self-sufficiency.
There are broadly two interpretive approaches one could take here. The first
is to claim that Aristotle is simply invoking different sorts of self-sufficiency in
these passages: many have taken his emphasis on the philosopher’s independence
from others to be one reason among many to treat EN X.6-8 as separate from
what precedes it, and in particular from his invocation of self-sufficiency in I.7.4
The second approach is to develop a single interpretation of self-sufficiency that
would allow us to make sense of his invocation of self-sufficiency in I.7 as well
as his argument that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous
activity. For instance, some commentators have taken the self-sufficiency at issue
in both contexts to be a matter of some activity’s finality:5 eudaimonia makes
our lives choiceworthy and lacking in nothing by being sufficient, on its own, to
structure our various practical pursuits—at least when adopted as the ultimate
end of these pursuits. And contemplation is the activity best suited to play this
structuring role, and therefore the most self-sufficient activity.6
I think we should favor this second interpretive approach, but resist the
thought that an activity’s self-sufficiency merely reflects its finality. My goal
in this paper is to develop a different interpretation, on which the notion of
4Nussbaum (2001: 373–77), for instance, takes Aristotle’s discussion of self-sufficiency to
serve as evidence that X.6-8 is a Platonic aside independent from the rest of the EN, and Brown
(forthcoming) distinguishes between “solitary” and “political” senses of self-sufficiency, arguing
that the former is invoked in EN X, and the latter everywhere else. See also Curzer (1990: 422–24)
on these points. Aristotle’s use of self-sufficiency has also been invoked to motivate the view that
EN X focuses exclusively on the intellectual part of our human nature—on which see Cooper
(1975: 168–80) or Whiting (1986).
5Here and below I use “final” (τέλειος) and its cognates as terms of art (except in text [4],
where “complete” is a more appropriate translation). Something is final insofar as it serves as an
end for the sake of which we pursue other goods or activities. Like self-sufficiency, finality comes
in degrees—happiness is the most final of human goods.
6Different versions of this position are defended in Cooper (2003) and Lear (2004). I’ll be
pointing out some difficulties with this interpretation (and interpretations that posit two senses of
self-sufficiency) below.
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self-sufficiency at play in both I.7 and X.6-8 stems chiefly from Aristotle’s convic-
tion that eudaimonia is something we pursue by our own means, by engaging in
activities which are distinctively “up to us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), that is, activities whose
successful unfolding depends on their agent rather than on luck or fortuitous ex-
ternal circumstances. I’ll argue that this kind of self-sufficiency—self-sufficiency as
a form of independence from external contributors to some activity—is implicit in
Aristotle’s treatment of external goods, as well as his discussion of self-sufficiency
in political contexts. I’ll then explain how, on this reading, a self-sufficient activity
would “on its own” make our lives “choiceworthy and lacking in nothing,” as
Aristotle tells us in EN I, and why contemplation would plausibly turn out to be
the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity, as Aristotle tells us in EN X.7
1 Self-Sufficiency in EN
Happiness, Aristotle claims in EN I.7, is final and self-sufficient. Happiness
is (unqualifiedly) final because we find it worth pursuing for its own sake and
not for the sake of something else more than any other activity (1097a30-34),
and self-sufficient because it “on its own makes life choiceworthy and lacking in
nothing” (1097b14-15). These are presented as formal characteristics of happiness;
features any account of happiness must include in order to count, nominally, as
an account of happiness. And at first brush the self-sufficiency mentioned here
suggests that any such account would have to be a highly comprehensive one: it
seems that a happy, self-sufficient life will lack nothing at all, and that happiness
will therefore include any good whose absence would leave our life “lacking” in
some respect.
Now, this is not to say that happiness must include all goods whatsoever, or
include maximal amounts of these goods. Aristotle plainly doesn’t intend his
account of a flourishing human life to include, say, all the pleasures one could
possibly experience, or any sort of honor one might achieve—and certainly not
in just any amount.8 Nor indeed does what Aristotle says here necessarily imply
that happiness comprehends a variety of goods which, taken together, make a life
worth choosing. Happiness could just be a single good (virtuous activity) that
makes our lives choiceworthy and “lacking in nothing” when we have it—lacking
in nothing of significance, that is, because nothing is more choiceworthy than
7This reading is, I think, briefly alluded to in Broadie (1991: 52–53; 424–25), Gauthier and Jolif
(1970: 52), and Kraut (1989: 298–99). It also agrees on a number of points with the discussion of
self-sufficiency in Hitz (2011), though the focus there is mostly on the self-sufficiency of friendship.
One of my main aims here is to spell out the sort of “independence” at issue, and explain how this
independence might help us make sense of the criterial use of self-sufficiency in I.7.
8As is well brought out in White (1990: 113).
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a life of virtue.9 The self-sufficiency requirement presented in EN I.7 is thus
orthogonal to broader interpretive disputes concerning Aristotle’s account of
happiness: happiness could be self-sufficient as an inclusive combination of many
goods, but it could also be self-sufficient if it turns out to consist in the single
good that is virtuous activity.10
It remains clear, however—whatever exactly eudaimonia turns out to be—that
a happy life will require a number of different goods. Either these goods will be
required as constitutive parts of a happy human life, or, if happiness just is virtuous
activity, these goods will be required, minimally, as prerequisites for our acting
virtuously. In both cases, our lives would be lacking without these goods—because
they are intrinsically good constituents of our happiness, or simply because we
could not act virtuously (and so could not be happy) without them. Thus on
anyone’s account, we must have a number of goods at our disposal in order to
be happy. And this is so because a happy life must be self-sufficient, in the sense
Aristotle articulates in I.7.11
But then at X.7 1177a27-b1, Aristotle also says the following:12
[1] Self-sufficiency will belong most to the activity of contemplation. For
the philosopher, the just individual, and all the rest equally need the necessi-
ties of life, but once these are adequately supplied for all, the just individual
will still need people towards whom and with whom he might act justly, and
likewise for the temperate, the brave, and the others. But the philosopher
can engage in contemplation by himself, and all the more so the wiser he is.
He will perhaps do this better with colleagues around, but he remains the
most self-sufficient all the same.
The self-sufficiency mentioned here seems to be a quality activities possess to
a greater extent the fewer resources we need to perform them. Any kind of
activity has some basic prerequisites, but once these are secured contemplation’s
9For readings along these lines, see for instance Heinaman (1988), Kenny (1992: 24–42), Kraut
(1989: 294–300), Labarrière (2003), or Lear (2004: 47–71). Readings on which happiness includes
various intrinsic goods are defended in Ackrill (1974), Cooper (1975: 122), Devereux (1981),
Gauthier and Jolif (1970: 53), Irwin (1999), Keyt (1978: 138–39), and Whiting (1986).
10I take the argument to this effect in Kraut (1989: 298) to be convincing—and see also Heinaman
(1988) against the view that Aristotle’s self-sufficiency requirement implies a “comprehensive” view
of happiness. (Cards on the table: I think happiness just is virtuous activity. But I also think
what I have to say about self-sufficiency here is compatible with a range of different interpretations
of eudaimonia—though it does complicate certain arguments for or against these interpretations.
For the sake of simplicity I will sometimes identify eudaimonia with virtuous activity in what
follows—though I will formulate things in a non-committal way where it makes a difference.)
11Lear (2004: 48–49) argues that the fact that certain goods are required as prerequisites for
virtuous activity does not affect the self-sufficiency of happiness. I’ll argue below that there is
unambiguous evidence this is not so: our need for such prerequisites does limit our self-sufficiency.
12The translations of EN in this paper are adaptations of Ross (2009).
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independence from others makes it more self-sufficient than any of the moral
virtues discussed prior to book X. And this is presented (at 1177a12-13) as one
of the reasons why contemplation is the highest and most final of the virtues—a
point Aristotle had already intimated in his account of happiness in book I.13
Now, there are some immediate difficulties involved in reconciling [1] with
what Aristotle says in I.7. For starters, note that self-sufficiency, as Aristotle
uses the notion in [1], is a gradable notion: contemplation is said to be the most
self-sufficient activity, or at least more self-sufficient than various forms of morally
virtuous activity. The self-sufficiency criterion in I.7, by contrast, is an absolute.
Note also that in [1] Aristotle ascribes some degree of self-sufficiency to both the
activity of contemplation and to those engaged in this activity—the philosopher is
said to be most self-sufficient, not just his contemplative activity. But the criterion
in I.7 is meant to describe eudaimonia—which is an activity, arguably, or else
an activity together with other intrinsic goods, but certainly not an individual.
There is, finally, a somewhat broader difference in the role self-sufficiency plays
in each context. For in I.7, self-sufficiency is used to describe what happiness is.
But prima facie the question what happiness is is separate from the question how
anyone might achieve happiness, or what sorts of activities might make us happy,
and how many resources these activities require. Yet in X.6-8, and in passage [1]
in particular, Aristotle seems concerned with this latter set of questions: he seems
to be telling us that low-resource activities are the way to achieve happiness. And
this might all seem orthogonal to the claim that happiness is itself a self-sufficient
thing, in the criterial sense at play in I.7.
But these initial difficulties are not as problematic as they might appear.
Consider the first. It’s true that self-sufficiency is invoked as an absolute in I.7.
But presumably this absolute can be approximated, or fulfilled to a greater or lesser
extent—even ignoring Aristotle’s discussion in X.6-8, it would be natural to think
that something might count as more self-sufficient the more choiceworthy and
less “lacking” it makes a life. On this reading, the absolute use of “self-sufficient”
would simply denote a sufficiently high degree of self-sufficiency (just as “tall”
denotes a sufficiently high degree of tallness). Human happiness would thus count
as self-sufficient in virtue of its being highly self-sufficient, or as self-sufficient as
any human activity could possibly be.14
As for the locus of self-sufficiency, I think we can draw a straightforward
connection between the self-sufficiency of activities and the self-sufficiency of indi-
13See for instance 1098a16-18 and 1099a29-31.
14There’s some independent motivation for reading Aristotle this way, since he suggests elsewhere
(Pol 1253a29) that the highest degree of self-sufficiency would not be possible for any human being,
but only for “a beast or a god.” (Presumably the life of a beast is not choiceworthy, so strictly
speaking only a god could achieve complete self-sufficiency, in the sense at play in I.7.)
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viduals: an individual counts as self-sufficient insofar as the activity characteristic
of the kind of life she leads is self-sufficient. A philosopher, on this reading, would
be self-sufficient because contemplation is self-sufficient, and her contemplative
activity determines the sort of life she leads.15 There’s some direct evidence of
this way of speaking at X.7 1177b21-24, where Aristotle tells us that various
qualities ascribed to the happy person, including self-sufficiency, are so ascribed in
accordance with their activity (κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν, 1177b23). There’s
some indirect evidence, too: at times Aristotle describes as self-sufficient the lives
of the self-sufficient (cf. [2], below), where again what seems to be at stake is the
sort of activity that characterizes the life in question.
And finally, though the self-sufficiency criterion does not itself tell us how we
might achieve happiness, or how many resource this would require, it would be
quite reasonable to draw some broad conclusions on the matter from its invocation
in I.7. For suppose we accept that eudaimonia must make our lives choiceworthy
and lacking in nothing. There seem to be roughly two ways this criterion could
be met. On the one hand, eudaimonia might make for a choiceworthy life in
which all our significant needs are met, however many they may be—that is, a
life that might require a lot, but is always well supplied, and so does not lack
anything. On the other, eudaimonia might make for a choiceworthy life in which
we need nothing at all, or at least nothing beyond the most basic necessities—that
is, a life that is frugal, and therefore doesn’t have much it could possibly lack.
And one might think that this latter point is the one Aristotle emphasizes in his
discussion of contemplation: contemplation is a low-resource activity, and thus
highly self-sufficient—highly self-sufficient because a contemplative life will be
choiceworthy and have few needs, and so could not possibly be lacking in much.
The more pressing difficulty, I think, is that such frugal approaches to happi-
ness plainly conflict with Aristotle’s broader discussion of virtuous activity. For
Aristotle has no qualms about incorporating a broad range of goods in his account
of the moral virtues. We’re told, for instance, that the munificent will need to
“spend large amounts with good taste” (IV.2 1222b1), that the magnanimous will
need honors sufficient to satisfy their ample self-esteem (IV.3 1123b13-15), and
even that the temperate will need an abundance of resources (X.8 1178a33). In
general, Aristotle explains, “more things are needed the greater and nobler the
deeds” (X.8 1178b2-3). Indeed some of his remarks in I.7 already suggest this:
right after introducing the self-sufficiency criterion, Aristotle adds that it should
15We need not spend all our time contemplating to lead a characteristically contemplative life,
nor even take contemplation to be the ultimate purpose of all our actions, though it must act as an
overarching, life-shaping concern. For different takes on the relationship between activities and
the lives they characterize, see Broadie and Rowe (2002: 437–38), Cooper (1975: 155–68), Keyt
(1978: 145–46), or Lear (2004: 201–204).
6
not be understood as “that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who
lives a solitary life, but also in relation to his parents, children, wife, and in general
to his friends and fellow citizens” (1097b8-11), and it’s natural to think that the
inclusion of family, friends and fellow citizens here will require more goods than
would be necessary for a solitary human being.16 So even if leading a frugal life
seemed a natural way to meet the self-sufficiency criterion advanced in I.7, this
would not coincide with Aristotle’s discussion of moral virtue throughout EN,
which makes it clear that human flourishing requires quite a lot.
Now, one could simply claim that Aristotle has two distinct senses of self-
sufficiency in mind—one on which lower-resource activities are more self-sufficient,
and another on which the amount of resources required is immaterial. But there
are good reasons to resist this kind of approach. The most important one is that
Aristotle’s discussion in X.7 rehearses a number of criteria which were intro-
duced in I.7-8, where eudaimonia is described as active, chosen for its own sake,
part of a serious life, continuous, stable, self-sufficient, and pleasant. Aristotle’s
argument in X.7 is that contemplation exhibits these features more than any
other activity, and he explicitly says that this is “in agreement with what was said
before” (1177a18-19). But outside I.7 there is only one prior passage in EN where
self-sufficiency plays any significant role (in IX.9, as part of Aristotle’s discussion
of friendship), and that passage refers back to the characterization of happiness in
I.7. So it’s not clear what Aristotle could be alluding to here apart from his use of
self-sufficiency as a criterion for eudaimonia.
A better approach, to my mind, is to try to articulate a single conception
of self-sufficiency that would account for the various passages in which we find
the notion invoked, and put to apparently different uses. But before attempting
this, I want to say a bit more about the constraints I think such an interpretation
would have to meet. The first constraint concerns the scope of the self-sufficiency
requirement. I mentioned above that happiness would require a range of different
goods, and that it would require these goods because happiness is self-sufficient.
But self-sufficiency is not something we achieve merely by having a lot of goods
at our disposal.17 Consider for instance what Aristotle says at Pol 1280b30-35:18
[2] A state is not the mere sharing of some common location, and doesn’t
16This passage could also be understood as “self-sufficient for his parents, children, ...,” suggesting
that an individual’s happiness would include the happiness of his entourage (cf. Irwin (1999: 182)).
I think it’s more plausible to read this passage as emphasizing the political nature of individual
human beings, but on either reading more goods will be required for self-sufficiency: we need more
goods to make others happy, but we also need more goods to make ourselves happy as political
beings (since we need virtuous friends, healthy children, and so on).
17Contra Brown (forthcoming: 6).
18Here and in passage [6], below, I adapt Reeve’s translation.
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exist for the purpose of preventing mutual wrongdoing and exchanging
goods. These conditions must be present if indeed there is to be a state, but
even if all of them are present there is not yet a state—a state is, rather, a
community of households and families that live well, for the sake of a final
and self-sufficient life.
The “final and self-sufficient” life alluded to here is presumably a happy life—which
Aristotle picks out using the same criteria he invokes in EN I.7. And what he
tells us here is that even the life led by those in a society that distributes goods
efficiently and is governed well enough to keep these goods secure might fail to
be a happy one. Elsewhere Aristotle explains that a state exists for the sake of
living well and achieving happiness, and not for the sake of mere life—for we can
survive without a state, and even to some degree on our own (cf. Pol 1252b27ff;
1321b15-18). So commerce and exchange do contribute to our self-sufficiency,
by providing us with the resources necessary for happy life. But they don’t
themselves guarantee that we live a happy, self-sufficient life.
Aristotle makes a similar point in his discussion of friendship: unlike utility-
or pleasure-friends, virtue-friends are not there simply to help us acquire goods
like money, food, or other things we need as prerequisites for a flourishing human
life. The value of virtue-friends stems from the fact that their collaboration
improves virtuous activities we already engage in—and such friends are a crucial
component of a self-sufficient life even though they aren’t helping us (qua virtue-
friends) secure goods without which we couldn’t engage in virtuous activity (IX.9
1169b23-30).19 So self-sufficiency is not just a matter of our having certain goods
at our disposal: we could have all the prerequisites necessary for our various
pursuits and nonetheless fail to be self-sufficient.
This constraint should come as no surprise. For having various goods at
our disposal does not itself guarantee that we pursue any particular activity, or
indeed that we pursue any activity at all. If I’m right that individuals count as self-
sufficient when their lives are characterized by a self-sufficient activity, then it’s
plain that the mere possession of prerequisites for some activity would not make
anyone self-sufficient. In fact, Aristotle suggests elsewhere that accumulating too
many goods would be an impediment to our happiness: we need a certain number
of goods to be self-sufficient, but self-sufficiency does not always increase with the
amount of goods we possess (cf. EN VII.13 1153b23-24 and Pol 1256b30ff). We
would need to put our resources to good use.
Still, we shouldn’t conclude from this that our need for prerequisites has no
bearing at all on our self-sufficiency. It’s sometimes suggested that Aristotle only
appeals to the self-sufficiency of contemplation as a final end, that is, as an activity
19A convincing argument to this effect can be found in Hitz (2011: 18–23).
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whose pursuit as a final end guarantees, on its own, the choiceworthiness of our
lives. On this sort of view our self-sufficiency is not affected by our need for
prerequisite goods: Aristotle is assuming the prerequisites are there, and then
claiming that contemplation (when treated as a final end) will structure our lives
in a way that guarantees their choiceworthiness, without the addition of any
further good.20 If this is right only goods affecting the choiceworthiness of our
lives could pose a threat to our self-sufficiency.
But it seems hard to reconcile such an interpretation with what Aristotle says
later in X.8. After arguing that happiness is contemplation, he tells us that:
[3] As humans, we will still need external prosperity, too; for our nature
is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body also
must be healthy and must have food and other attention. But we must not
think that many or great things are needed for he who is to be happy [...]
Self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess, and we can do noble acts
without ruling earth and sea. (1178b33-79a5)
Now, Aristotle speaks in this passage of our human natures being self-sufficient for
contemplation, rather than contemplators or their contemplative activity being
self-sufficient. But in context the implication is clear: as human creatures we
will need certain basic goods even for low-resource activities like contemplation,
and this sets a limit on the degree of self-sufficiency we can hope to attain in our
contemplative activity, and so a limit on the degree of self-sufficiency that belongs
to human contemplation. Evidently our basic needs for health and nourishment
are taken to pose a threat to the self-sufficiency of the contemplative life—if
they didn’t, Aristotle wouldn’t need to emphasize that we can be virtuous with
moderate resources. Yet food and drink, for Aristotle, do not contribute to the
choiceworthiness of our lives—they’re the sorts of things necessary for mere life,
and he explicitly tells us that having them would not make anyone’s life worth
choosing (see e.g. VII.4 1147b24-31). So self-sufficiency cannot be self-sufficiency
concerning only those goods that make our lives choiceworthy ones. For as
Aristotle makes clear in this passage, our need for even the most rudimentary
goods is a qualification on our self-sufficiency.
There are therefore two constraints on an interpretation of the notion of
self-sufficiency at play in these passages—assuming, as I think we should, that
Aristotle is indeed using a single, univocal notion in his argument. The first is
that self-sufficiency be diminished by our need for even the most basic goods:
this is why our animal needs are a limiting condition on our self-sufficiency,
even when we lead a contemplative life. The second, as previously noted, is that
self-sufficiency not follow merely from our possessing the goods necessary for
20For this reading of self-sufficiency, see in particular Lear (2004).
9
our survival and the pursuit of virtuous activity: self-sufficiency is not directly
commensurate with the level of resources at our disposal.
In what follows I will defend an interpretation of self-sufficiency which meets
these constraints—and which has independent textual support. I will argue that
the notion of self-sufficiency at play in these passages is better understood as part
of Aristotle’s broader concern with the dependence of eudaimonia on individual
agents rather than on their possessions, circumstances, or good fortune. Indeed,
despite including a vast array of external goods in his account of happiness, Aristo-
tle often insists that their role is secondary, that virtuous action is ultimately up to
us, and that happiness is something we must achieve rather than a state we might
find ourselves in. I will be arguing that the kind of independence from external
forces we display when acting virtuously is central to Aristotle’s understanding
of self-sufficiency—eudaimonia is fundamentally self-sufficient because virtuous
activity depends on us, and contemplation ismost self-sufficient because it exhibits
this feature to a greater extent than any other form of virtuous activity.
Spelling out exactly how virtuous activity might be independent from forces
external to us will be my concern in the next two sections of this paper. I will
begin by demarcating two different roles played by external goods in the EN : as
necessary conditions for virtuous activity, and as cooperative goods—goods that
naturally contribute to the successful achievement of certain virtuous ends. I will
then describe how Aristotle reconciles each of these roles with his conviction
that happiness is up to us, and show how his claims about the self-sufficiency of
contemplation, in EN X, and the self-sufficiency of happiness, in EN I, are natural
consequences of these views.
2 Happiness and External Goods
The conclusion of Aristotle’s function argument is that happiness is “activity of
the soul in accordance with virtue [...] over a complete life” (I.7 1098a16-18). In
I.8 Aristotle adds that such happiness “clearly requires external goods as well;
for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment”
(1099a31). This qualification simply reflects the commonsense point that we will
need resources to live a flourishing human life, even if these resources do not on
their own make our lives flourishing ones.
The resources in question should be understood quite broadly, as including
all goods that are not goods of our soul—that is, all goods that do not pertain
directly to our distinctively human capacities. So food, wealth, social status,
friends, family, physical beauty, and health, are all external goods, as is any good
we might aim at producing in another person, like the health and education of our
offspring, and anything that might constitute favorable circumstances for some
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action.21 Aristotle sometimes describes these goods as those that are governed or
caused by chance, and tells us this distinguishes them from things like a just or
temperate character, which we must develop on our own.22 External goods are
therefore goods we do not possess or realize by our own devices.
Aristotle separates external goods into two categories: some “must necessarily
be there as conditions of happiness,” while others “are naturally cooperative
(συνεργά) and useful as instruments (ὀργανικῶς)” (I.9 1099b27-28).23 Goods in
the first category can be thought of as preconditions for human happiness. Some
of these are preconditions for happiness because they are required for virtuous
activity—we need food, water, a moderately healthy body, as well as some amount
of freedom to perform activities of any sort, and in addition to these virtuous
activity will often require a fair amount of money, political standing, and so
on, as well as, generally, opportunities to act virtuously. Other goods in this
first category are preconditions for happiness simply because anyone who lacks
them is miserable: Aristotle is no Stoic, and takes it as obvious that someone
suffering a fate like Priam’s is unhappy (1100a7-8).24 External goods that serve
as preconditions therefore make it possible for us to be happy in one of two
ways—first, by providing the conditions under which virtuous action is possible,
and second, by shielding us from outright miserable conditions, under which
even the most virtuous person couldn’t reasonably be considered happy.
Goods in the second category, Aristotle tells us, cooperate with our activity:
they serve as instruments that are naturally well-suited to some end we’ve set
ourselves. These goods are sometimes portrayed simply as means, or instrumental
goods—goods that contribute to bringing about a given end, and whose value
derives from the value of that end.25 This might be right, but I think it doesn’t go
far enough. After all, preconditions are arguably means as well—at least in the
21For a defense of this broad reading of external goods, see Cooper (1985). Aristotle wavers a
bit on the goods of the body, which he categorizes as internal goods at Rhet 1360b25-29 (cf. also
Pol 1323a25-26). The thought might be that our bodies are more naturally considered part of our
selves than something like wealth—though in EN X at least it’s clear that our bodies are treated as
external to us (cf. 1178b33-35).
22See for instance EN 1100b8-11, Pol 1323b27-29, MM 1206b30-37, or MM 1207b17-19.
23I take this distinction to mirror the one Aristotle draws earlier between goods whose absence
mars our happiness (sometimes to the point of ruining it), and goods we use as tools (δι’ ὀργάνων)
in our actions (1099a31ff), and also the one he draws later, in passage [1], between the “necessities”
for life and our need for people with and towards whom we might act virtuously. For more details
on the textual similarities between these passages, see Reeve (1992: 163–64).
24For the Stoic view, see e.g. SVF III.585 or Cicero, Tusc. Disp. I.35. For Aristotle the virtuous
bear misfortunes gracefully (1100b30-32) and always make the best of their circumstances (1101a1ff),
but are nonetheless deemed unhappy if the circumstances are bad enough. On Aristotle’s treatment
of Priam and his misfortunes, see Nussbaum (2001: 327–36).
25As for instance in Cooper (1985: 184).
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minimal sense that they help bring about some end—and so this wouldn’t be a
feature distinctive of cooperative externals. Moreover, Aristotle often describes
these goods in more evocative terms, as literally working with us in some activity
(as συνεργά goods), or as contributing to some activity just as a tool would—since,
in his words, we often act “by means of friends, or wealth, or political power, as
though by means of tools (δι’ ὀργάνων)” (1099a33-b1).
Now, Aristotle never explicitly spells out what this sort of contribution
amounts to, or how exactly it would differ from the sort of contribution made by
preconditions. But he does make some suggestive remarks. At Pol 1256a1ff, for
instance, Aristotle describes two ways wealth acquisition (χρηματιστική) might
assist household management (οἰκονομική): in the way shuttle production assists
weaving, or in the way bronze smelting assists in the sculpting of statues. The
distinction between these ancillary activities rests on a distinction between the
sorts of goods they provide: the former provides cooperative goods (it “provides
tools,” 1256a7), while the latter provides goods used as preconditions—as he puts
the point here, bronze smelting “provides the matter” for sculpting, in the same
way wool gathering would provide the wool needed for weaving. The point of the
analogy, I take it, is that goods like wool or bronze are indispensable prerequisites
for our activity: no weaving or sculpting at all is possible without them (or
adequate material alternatives). Goods like a shuttle, by contrast, are not strictly
necessary for weaving, but plainly improve the activity for which they were
designed: we weave better with a shuttle, though we could still, perhaps with
some difficulty, weave without one. Unlike preconditions, then, cooperative
goods do not serve to make an activity possible. They improve an activity that
we are already performing, or are already in a position to perform.26
It may be a bit harder to see how this sort of line would apply to the collabo-
rators or targets of some activity—the case of those towards whom or with whom
we might act virtuously (cf. X.7 1177a27-b1, where the collaborators are explicitly
identified as συνεργοί). For one might think that these collaborators act more
like preconditions than cooperative goods—it may seem, for instance, that no
courageous activity at all is possible without others to be courageous towards,
or courageous with. But I think the point still stands: courageous activity does
indeed require targets and collaborators of some sort, but it remains the case that
courageous activity will go better with certain targets and collaborators than it
does with others. On Aristotle’s view, courage on the battlefield is possible in all
sorts of circumstances: hitting the mean might, in some cases, require us to help
26Though I disagree with other parts of his view, I am in agreement here with Cooper’s
distinction between perfect and imperfect exercises of virtue, and his understanding of the role
certain goods play in promoting the former. For these points, see Cooper (1985: 182–83).
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someone with our own bare hands, or face down some insignificant opponent.
But intuitively this is not an ideal exercise of courage. An ideal exercise of courage
takes place when, say, we stand our ground alongside steadfast fellow soldiers, and
successfully defend ourselves and our city against a worthy, determined opponent.
So while courageous activity of any sort may require others, ideal acts of courage
require collaborators of a special kind—excellent fellow soldiers, a worthy invader,
and so on. The collaborators that improve our activity in this way would serve
as cooperative external goods. They aren’t strictly required for virtuous activity
(lesser fellow soldiers or opponents would do), but they do allow for an ideal or
perfect display of virtue.
What this makes clear, I think, is that Aristotle should not be read as picking
out some list of goods that always qualify as preconditions, and some other list of
goods that always qualify as cooperative goods. The distinction is best understood
as a distinction between two roles external goods can play. Thus some given good
could plausibly qualify as a precondition for happiness in some contexts, and
as a cooperative good in others. Friends are the most obvious case: Aristotle
tells us their absence or death would make our life miserable, and so they qualify
as preconditions for happiness. But (at least in virtue friendships) they are also
collaborators, and contribute to our happiness by improving our own virtuous
activity.27 Likewise, a lyre of some sort is a precondition for lyre-playing. But
a lyre might also—if it’s an especially good lyre, in the right hands—make for a
particularly splendid lyre performance, and so serve as a cooperative good.28
External goods have the potential to affect our happiness in either role. Pre-
conditions on our happiness must be in place to make virtuous activity possible
and ensure some basic level of good fortune. And cooperative goods, though we
may not need them to act virtuously, will affect the extent to which our virtuous
activity makes us happy. For, as Aristotle tells us,29
27See Hitz (2011: 23–25) for an account of the role our friends play in improving our contempla-
tive activity.
28Just as, in our example above, some sort of opponent might be a precondition for courageous
activity, but also—if the opponent is a splendid Persian army, say—improve our courageous activity,
and so serve as a cooperative good. (Assuming here that great acts of courage require great
opponents.)
29Aristotle doesn’t directly label the goods here as goods that play a cooperative role. But it’s
reasonable to think that what he says must apply to cooperative externals, whether or not it
also applies to preconditions. For he goes on to add (right after this, at 1153b23-24, and also
in the parallel passages cited in the main text) that having too many of these goods would be an
impediment to our happiness. And there’s no reason why having too many goods conceived
as preconditions would impede anything: they just give us more opportunities to act virtuously.
The dangers associated with a glut of goods are more plausible if the goods are conceived of as
cooperative ones—a connection Aristotle himself makes at Pol 1256b30ff and Pol 1323b7-12. (To be
clear: a lack of preconditions would surely impede our happiness—in a rather dramatic way, since
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[4] No activity is complete (τέλειος) when it is impeded and happiness is a
complete thing; this is why the happy man needs the goods of the body and
external goods, i.e. those of fortune, namely, in order that he may not be
impeded (μὴ ἐμpiοδίζηται) in these ways. (VII.13 1153b16-19)
Using the same language, he calls an excessive number of friends an impediment
to our happiness (1170b26-27), and an excessive amount of external goods of
any sort an impediment to contemplation (1178b3-4). In the Politics he defines a
happy life as a life that “expresses virtue and is without impediment” (1295a36-37),
and compares the use of cooperative goods with the use a craftsman would make
of his tools: tools are not more useful the more of them we have at our disposal,
and having too many tools might pose a threat to our self-sufficiency, and end up
doing more harm than good (1256b30ff, 1323b7-12).
Our happiness is therefore impeded either by lacking cooperative goods or by
possessing too many of them. When we lack them we are like a craftsman without
his tools: we lack an instrument that would naturally assist us and improve our
virtuous activity. Though we may still make the best of our circumstances, our
activity will not unfold as well as it might—leaving us less happy than we might
have been.30 Aristotle says less about our having too many such cooperative
goods—but what he does say suggests that we would spend too much time and
effort looking after them (Pol 1326b10ff), which would get in the way of our
actually doing what we set out to do, or that they would make us arrogant and
entitled, or cause envy, or otherwise detract from the development and effective
use of practical wisdom (Pol 1295b13ff).
This all seems reasonable enough. Aristotle thinks virtuous activity is possible
in all sorts of suboptimal conditions: we can act generously despite being poor, say,
or temperately despite being ugly. But intuitively these activities would go better
if we had certain goods at our disposal: enough wealth that our generosity would
actually help others, or looks good enough that we would truly need to exhibit
temperance. And not too many of these goods: too many goods would require
too much attention to protect and maintain, which is a distraction from actually
being generous, temperate, or otherwise virtuous. So while virtuous activity will
happiness is impossible without them. My claim is only that this is not the only point Aristotle is
making here. Our happiness can be impeded even when the preconditions are in place.)
30Cooper (1985: 195) resists the idea that the success of our activities has anything to do with our
favoring certain circumstances in which to pursue them, arguing instead that external goods used
as tools are valuable only because they make possible “continued virtuous activity in the future.”
But Aristotle explicitly compares the unfortunate virtuous person with “a good shoemaker,” who
“always makes the best of circumstances [...] and makes the best shoes out of the hides that are
given him” (I.10 1101a4-5); and the emphasis here is plainly on the product of our virtuous activity,
or what we are able to successfully bring about or achieve in bad circumstances (whether what we
achieve is a physical object like a shoe, or just the successful performance of some activity).
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take different forms in different circumstances, some circumstances nonetheless
provide the ideal setting for virtuous action, and contribute to the ideal unfolding
of our acts of virtue. We might still be generous in deciding to help a friend (and
correctly determining how to achieve this end) when our misfortunes hinder
our efforts, and limit the effects of our generosity. But our virtuous behavior
contributes most to our happiness when it succeeds unhindered.31 If this is right,
our overall happiness will always depend on cooperative external goods—for some
quantity of these goods is invariably required for our activities to succeed without
impediment.
3 Self-Sufficiency as Independent Activity
I have just argued that external goods play an important role in Aristotle’s account
of happiness. Some goods are just prerequisites for virtuous activity, or conditions
on our happiness. Others contribute to our happiness by cooperating with our
activity and assisting in its successful unfolding. In each case, something must
happen to us or to the world around us which we cannot bring about, or at least
which we cannot fully control: we need to be healthy, have a fair amount of
wealth, be born in the right city, and benefit from a good education (among other
things) to be able to act virtuously at all, and even then we need some amount
of good fortune for our virtuous activity to unfold without hindrance, and thus
contribute to our happiness as much as it might.
Yet despite stressing our reliance on such external goods, Aristotle often and
unambiguously emphasizes that we are responsible for our happiness—that virtu-
ous action is something we do rather than something we have, or which might
happen to us. As he puts it in the Politics “external goods come of themselves
and by chance, while no one is just or temperate by or through chance” (VII.1
1323b27-29).32 It’s fairly easy to see why this would be the case despite our need
for goods that serve as preconditions for virtuous activity: these goods are valu-
able only when put to judicious use, and many of them are prerequisites for any
activity whatsoever.33 But the case may be less clear when it comes to cooperative
31Where success need not be understood as our securing some outcome external to our act of
courage: our activity can be successful simply in virtue of its performance unfolding in the best
possible way. In cases like generous activity, however, it seems natural to consider the outcome of
our activity as a key factor in its overall success.
32See also EN I.8 1099a4-5, I.10 1100b12-16, III.5 1113b5-15.
33Aristotle insists, for instance, that “munificence is excellence of effect,” stemming from the mu-
nificent individual’s ability to create a “greater and more suitable effect” with the same expenditure
as the generous one (IV.2 1122b12-19). Thus munificence requires a lot of money, but wealth alone
doesn’t make anyone munificent. As he puts it elsewhere, “to live well is not the same as having
things without which one cannot live well” (EE 1214b16-17).
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goods. Aristotle tells us that “doing well or poorly does not depend on [our for-
tunes], but as we said human life needs these in addition, while virtuous activities
are what determine happiness, and their opposites what determine its opposite”
(I.10 1100b8-11). But if the success of our virtuous activities always depends on
cooperative goods, and our overall happiness is affected by this success, it’s not
immediately clear why virtuous activity would itself “determine happiness,” or
why Aristotle would take our happiness to be, ultimately, up to us. By his own
admission, cooperative externals depend on luck, and so are not under our control.
If indeed these externals have a significant impact on our overall happiness, in
what sense is virtuous activity the one privileged factor that “determines” or
“causes” our happiness?
Aristotle’s argument here, I take it, is based on the view that, whatever else
contributes to her success, a virtuous agent succeeds primarily because of her own
practical wisdom—something that is not a matter of luck or good fortune. He
puts the point best in the EE:34
[5] We can see that some people are fortunate. For those who lack practical
wisdom succeed in many things where luck rules; and also in areas where
there is a craft, but where there is also scope for luck, for instance in the case
of generalship and navigation. [...] That they do not succeed by practical
wisdom is evident. For practical wisdom is not without an account—it can
account for why it is acting in this or that way—but the fortunate would
not be able to say why they succeed (for that would be a craft). That they
succeed is obvious, though they are lacking in wisdom in the very things
in which they are fortunate, and not just in other matters. [...] For in
navigation it is not the most clever who are fortunate, but it is as in dice
where one man throws a blank and another throws a six in accordance with
his natural good fortune, or through being favored, as they say, by a god, so
that success is the result of something external. (VIII.2 1247a3-24)
Aristotle characterizes the fortunate here as those who succeed without the sort
of wisdom relevant to their activity. In some cases, this is because there is simply
34Here I adapt Kenny’s translation (following with him Jackson’s addition of ἕξ at 1247a23).
There are many questions about this passage that I will not touch upon here—for instance, whether
it is meant to be consistent with Aristotle’s treatment of luck in the Physics (on which see for
instance Johnson (1997), Johnson (2015), or Woods (1982: 167)), and whether it is meant to suggest
that good fortune could yield eudaimonia, or, less strongly, a kind of “doing well” (εὐpiραγία)
that amounts to something less than this (see Johnson (2015) for the former view, and Kenny
(1992: 57) or Ponesse (2012: 321–22) for the latter—and also Buddensiek (2012: 177–82) on the
broader relevance of good fortune to our happiness). For my purposes what matters is the contrast
drawn in this passage between good fortune and practical wisdom as distinct sources of success.
The contrast can be understood without taking a stance on these broader interpretive disputes. (I
do disagree with Cooper (1985: 193–95), whose reading downplays the impact the success of the
virtuous would have on their happiness, except as a precondition for further virtuous activity.)
16
no wisdom to be found: nobody is clever at dice, and if they throw sixes their
entire life that can only be the result of their enduring good fortune (either their
natural good fortune or else the fortune they receive as a favor from a god). In
other cases, though there is room for wisdom, the activity leaves a lot to chance.
Navigation is indeed a craft (cf. EN 1112b5), but even a skilled navigator doesn’t
always succeed at reaching their destination. For success at navigation is especially
prone to disruption by external forces: inclement weather might sink the saltiest
captain, while a complete novice might yet reach their port on a sunny day. To
succeed at navigation requires some knowledge and deliberative skill, but also,
invariably, some amount of luck—even once all the prerequisites for navigating
are in place.35
To the extent that success at navigation depends on luck, it does not depend
on the navigator’s wisdom. For to get lucky, Aristotle tells us here, is to succeed
without knowing the reason for one’s success, and the practically wise know why
they succeed. Indeed, this is one of the key ways in which Aristotle takes the sort
of practical wisdom distinctive of the virtuous to be similar to the knowledge
of a craftsman: practical wisdom and craft are both states “with reason” (μετὰ
λόγου), the former concerning how we should act, the latter how to produce
things (EN VI.4 1040a3-5).36 So the success virtuous agents find in achieving their
ends, when they succeed, should not be ascribed to some external good fortune.
For the virtuous succeed thanks to their practical wisdom, and success that results
from practical wisdom does not result from good fortune.
If this is right, we can see why Aristotle would think that cooperative externals
could not be a decisive factor in determining our happiness. Recall that Aristotle
thinks cooperative externals are goods controlled by luck—the sorts of goods that
contribute to the successful performance of some activity in a way that goes
beyond what we can achieve by our own devices, and in particular by means of
our practical wisdom. To say that such goods determine our happiness would
thus imply that luck determines our happiness. But as he tells us here, the success
of the practically wise is due to their wisdom—and so not due to luck. And this
is so even when these cooperative externals do in fact contribute something to
an activity’s success: as Aristotle emphasizes at Pol 1332a25ff, the craft of the
lyre player is the cause of her artful lyre playing, even though a good lyre might
help her fully display her skill. In the same way, the practical wisdom of a happy
person is the primary cause of her happiness, even though certain cooperative
35Given Aristotle’s mention of Socrates at 1247b15, this example is probably meant to remind us
of the discussion of wisdom and good fortune at Euthydemus 278–282, and in particular of the case
of navigation and perilous seas mentioned at 279e4-6. On the respective roles of wisdom and good
fortune in this passage, see Jones (2013: 6–8).
36See also EN VI.5 1140b20ff and VI.13 1144b16ff.
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externals might help her virtuous activity unfold in the best possible way.
What exactly distinguishes the contribution made by cooperative externals
from the contribution made by an agent’s wisdom? Aristotle never says.37 But a
plausible suggestion, given his descriptions of craft-knowledge and states “with
reason,” is that the practically wise are capable of bringing about both some result
and its opposite: the lyre player can play the right notes but also the wrong ones,
the practically wise engage in virtuous but also vicious activity.38 Cooperative
externals “controlled by luck,” by contrast, only contribute to some determinate
end to which they are naturally suited—as Aristotle sometimes puts the point,
they act “like fire burns... by some natural tendency” (Met A1 981b3-4; cf. also
Θ2 1046b6). Thus good lyres might serve to improve our playing, but do not
also potentially make it worse; and cooperative goods in general assist us only in
bringing about some specific end we’ve already set ourselves, and which we could
bring about (perhaps less well) in their absence.39
Implicit in Aristotle’s treatment of external goods, then, lies the thought that
these goods play a secondary role in the case of virtuous activity: our happiness
is largely in our own hands because our practical wisdom is the primary cause of
the successful achievement of our human function. Our wisdom is the primary
cause of this achievement because it affords us a form of rational control in
our activities: the wise are those who can generally bring about some result
or its opposite by deliberate choice, independent of the contribution of some
cooperative external—even where that contribution does align with their ends,
and improve their activity. Thus while a shoemaker might make better shoes with
better hides at his disposal, his craft lies in the fact that he “makes the best shoes
out of the hides that are given him” (EN I.10 1101a4-5). So too, the virtuous do
better with cooperative externals, but do not depend on them to succeed in their
37Nor does Aristotle specify how much could be left to chance before an activity is no longer
said to “primarily” depend on the wisdom of its agent. Presumably there is a continuum: rolling
dice doesn’t depend on the agent’s wisdom at all, navigation depends on it more, lyre-playing more
still—and, as I’ll be arguing, contemplation most of all. Navigation must reflect a navigator’s skill
enough to qualify as a craft, even if, among crafts, it leaves more to chance than others—on which
point see fn.40 below.
38On this feature of craft-knowledge, see Met Θ2 1046b5-25 and EN VI.5 1140b20-24. Of course
the practically wise will never exercise their capacity for vicious activity, given their morally virtuous
character. So while they could direct their wisdom towards vicious ends, as a matter of fact they
will never be moved to do so. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
39One potential challenge here is that fellow soldiers are not the sorts of “lifeless things” (ἄψυχα)
Aristotle often uses in these examples, even though they can serve as cooperative goods. But
Aristotle’s thought may be that qua cooperators in our activity, these fellow soldiers do indeed serve
only to assist us in some end we’ve set ourselves, just as any lifeless tool would. It remains true that
qua deliberators they could, in their own actions, display the sort of rational control distinctive of
the practically wise.
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virtuous activity.
And this, I think, is precisely the form of independence Aristotle associates
with self-sufficiency in the Politics, when considering the resources necessary for
an ideal, self-sufficient state.40 He begins by noting that a state, like an individual
human being, has a function to perform, and that the best state is the one best able
to achieve this function (1326a13). A certain number of people will be necessary
to do so—not too few, but not too many, either:
[6] A [state] that consists of too few people is not self-sufficient (and a state
is self-sufficient), but one that consists of too many, while it is self-sufficient
in the necessities, the way a group of people is, is still no state, since it is
not easy for it to have a constitution. For who will be the general of its
excessively large multitude, and who, unless he has the voice of Stentor, will
serve as its herald?
Hence the first state to arise is the one composed of the first multitude large
enough to be self-sufficient with regard to living the good life as a political
community. It is also possible for a state that exceeds this one in number
to be a greater state, but, as we said, this is not possible indefinitely. The
limit to its expansion can easily be seen from the facts. For a state’s actions
are either those of the rulers or those of the ruled. And a ruler’s task is
to issue orders and decide. But in order to decide lawsuits and distribute
offices on the basis of merit, each citizen must know what sorts of people
the other citizens are [something excessive population makes impossible].
[...] It is clear, then, that the best limit for a state is this: it is the greatest
size of multitude that promotes self-sufficiency in living and that can be
easily surveyed as a whole. The size of the state, then, should be determined
in this way. (1326b2-25)
So it does matter to the self-sufficiency of the state that it have enough people to be
self-sustaining. But this only makes it self-sufficient as any group of people might
be, that is, capable of providing the basic necessities for its citizens (αὐτάρκης
ὥσpiερ ἔθνος, 1326b4). The self-sufficiency of the state qua state is achieved
when it has the power to successfully actualize its distinctive function through
40There is also, I think, an analogous technical use of “self-sufficient” at EN III.3 1112a34-
b9, where Aristotle tells us that self-sufficient sciences (ἐpiιστῆμαι) like spelling do not involve
deliberation, whereas crafts like medicine, wealth acquisition, or navigation do. As Aristotle
explains, such crafts are not as precisely worked out, and are concerned with things in which the
outcome is obscure or indeterminate, while in matters of spelling there is no room for deliberation.
Here the self-sufficient sciences are identified as those whose results are fully determined by the
science itself and always brought about in the same manner, just as self-sufficient activities, on the
view I’ve been defending, are activities whose unfolding is determined by their agent, and which
do not depend on luck or good fortune. It’s significant, in light of passage [5], that navigation is
singled out in this context as being less worked out than a craft like gymnastics (1112b5-6).
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constitutional government—and this is impossible if the city is too large to be
managed as a whole.
There is a clear parallel between Aristotle’s remarks here and his insistence,
in [3], that the self-sufficiency of contemplation “does not depend on excess”
(1179a3). In both cases, there is a moderate need for external goods that serve
as preconditions for achieving a function (some quantity of people in the case
of a state, food and drink in the case of human beings). But in both cases,
the degree of self-sufficiency of the person or state does not increase with the
number of available goods. A state only truly counts as self-sufficient when it
is successfully fulfilling its function as an entity unified by constitutional rule.
So too, human beings only truly count as self-sufficient when they are the ones
fulfilling their function, that is, when they rely least in their activity on the
assistance of cooperative external goods. Self-sufficiency, then, is a form of
independence: we need certain goods to act at all, but once these goods are in
place we act self-sufficiently to the extent that we can achieve without external
assistance what we set out to do.41
4 Independence and Criterial Self-Sufficiency
I’ve argued so far that self-sufficiency is a form of independence from external
goods. Such an interpretation meets the two constraints outlined above. For the
self-sufficiency of some activity is indeed diminished by our need for even the
most basic goods: we depend on these goods as preconditions for the activity in
question. But an activity’s self-sufficiency is not increased merely by our acquiring
the resources necessary to perform it: we might have all the resources we need
but still depend, when performing the activity in question, on the assistance of
cooperative externals. An activity will be more self-sufficient the less it depends
on external goods for its successful performance—whether it depends on them
as preconditions or as cooperative goods. Hence even once preconditions are
accounted for, activities might exhibit varying degrees of self-sufficiency.
This helps us see, in particular, why virtuous activity exhibits a high degree of
self-sufficiency. Virtuous activity does have some prerequisites—sometimes many
prerequisites. But so do all activities. And once these are in place the success of
virtuous activity, on Aristotle’s view, depends primarily on our practical wisdom,
rather than our good fortune or the assistance of cooperative goods. In this
respect virtuous activity is more self-sufficient than an activity like throwing
dice, say, even once we set aside the resources necessary for each activity (cf. [5]).
41I am thus in agreement with Gauthier and Jolif (1970: 52): “Être «auto-suffisant», c’est sans
doute être comblé, mais c’est aussi et surtout être indépendant et c’est à cette indépendance qu’avant
tout le Grec aspire.”
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For achieving our human function, as Aristotle often insists, is largely up to us.
Rolling sixes is not.
It also helps us see why contemplation would be the most self-sufficient form
of virtuous activity, as Aristotle tells us in [1]. This is so not only because
contemplation has relatively few prerequisites. That would be a rather weak
point, since presumably many external goods are needed for contemplation to
be possible—a society that allows for philosophy, an education that engages
our rational capacities, and so on—and in any case Aristotle grants, in [1], that
contemplation requires “the necessities of life” like any other activity. What’s
more significant is that, once these prerequisites are in place, contemplation
depends least on the assistance of cooperative goods: the successful performance
of our contemplative activity depends more on ourselves (and less on fortuitous
external circumstances) than the successful performance of morally virtuous
activity. For as Aristotle tells us, the most purely noetic activities rely least on
luck (“there is most intellect (νοῦς) and reason where there is least luck, and
most luck where there is least intellect,” MM 1207a4-6). Contemplation aims
at no end besides itself (X.7 1177b2-3, 1177b20), and does not seek to realize
any outcome that might be impeded by misfortune or a lack of tools. Friends
might yet improve our contemplative activity by collaborating with us, but less
so than they do in cases of moral virtue—being alone is a severe impediment
on courageous (or generous, or just) activity, but only a minor impediment on
our contemplation. For all these reasons contemplation is as independent as any
human activity could be.
You might still wonder, however, whether this sort of reading is really com-
patible with the criterial use of self-sufficiency in I.7. For it’s not immediately
clear why this form of independence would be a feature of something that “on
its own” makes our lives “choiceworthy and lacking in nothing,” or how this
criterion is meant to follow from self-sufficiency of the sort I’ve been describing.
To address this point it will be helpful to consider some cases of things that fail
to meet the I.7 criterion. For instance pleasure, or honor, or some combination
of these, would have commonly been thought to make for a happy life, and thus
taken to be the sorts of goods the pursuit of which makes our lives “lacking in
nothing.”42 But in fact, as Aristotle argues, the pursuit of honor would not on its
own make our lives lacking in nothing. For honor depends on those who bestow
it more than it does on those who receive it (I.5 1095b24-25). So we would have
to add (at a minimum) that the pursuit of honor and its recognition by others,
42Lives characterized by the pursuit of honor or pleasure are just the traditional candidates
for happiness, as Aristotle presents them in EN I.5 (setting aside the life of contemplation—the
alternative Aristotle arguably ends up endorsing).
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taken together, make our life lacking in nothing.43 Thus honor itself cannot be
eudaimonia. For eudaimonia, as Aristotle emphasizes, is “our own, and hard to
take away,” while honor inevitably depends on others, and is thus never really up
to us, and thus such that its pursuit could not by itself make for a happy life (I.5
1095b26).
A life of honor is lacking, then, precisely because the pursuit of honor is an
activity that inherently depends on externals for its success. And it’s in this sense,
as I understand Aristotle, that it does not on its own make any life “lacking in
nothing.” We would always have to specify some external circumstances that do
not reflect any achievement on our part, and that go beyond our own pursuit of
honor, in order to make it count as a worthwhile pursuit. Virtuous activity, by
contrast, does not depend on externals in this way: we do not need something
else besides our own virtuous activity for our virtuous activity to go well (or at
least, we do not need much else—the virtuous still need certain resources, and are
certainly not completely immune to misfortune). This is akin, in language and in
content, to the conclusion drawn about wisdom in the Euthydemus: once someone
has wisdom there is no further need for good fortune (σοφίας piαρούσης [...]
μηδὲν piροσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας 280b2-3). For the wise typically achieve what they
set out to do, and do so primarily thanks to their own practical wisdom.
As I understand Aristotle, then, to say that eudaimoniamakes a life “lacking in
nothing” is not to say that there is nothing at all a happy person could reasonably
wish for. Even a happy person could wish for further goods—avoiding certain
minor misfortunes, being bestowed greater, well-deserved honors, enjoying more
simple pleasures, and so on. A happy life can surely be made better or worse in
various ways.44 The thought is only that once we are happy we do not need to
specify some further goods, besides our own eudaimonia, on which our happiness
would depend—in the way a life spent pursuing honors would always depend
for its value on the recognition of others. Of course this remains an ideal we
human creatures cannot fully realize: some externals are always needed for our
human activities to succeed.45 But virtuous activity’s high degree of independence
from externals makes it a good candidate in this regard, and contemplation’s even
43And further, we would have to specify that the honor be recognized by the wise. And since the
wise honor virtue, Aristotle goes on to argue, this would just amount to saying that virtue makes
life lacking in nothing—though he thinks we would still have to specify that virtuous activity is
required, not just a virtuous character. There are thus many reasons why honor is not eudaimonia.
But one important one is that it always depends on externals, and so does not on its own make our
lives lacking in nothing.
44As is convincingly argued in Cooper (2003: 288) and Lear (2004: 60–62). See also Heina-
man (1988: 42) and Lear (2004: 65) on Aristotle’s subsequent claim that happiness is the most
choiceworthy good “not being counted together” with these goods (1097b16-20).
45Aristotle’s god, as pure activity, would presumably be ideally self-sufficient.
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higher degree of independence from externals makes it an even better one.
It is less clear, I concede, why this sort of independence would itself make our
lives choiceworthy ones. After all, a solitary life led in pursuit of simple pleasures
might not depend on any great quantity of external goods, in either of the roles
I’ve described, but it wouldn’t thereby be a life worth choosing.46 I think there
are two possible answers here. One would be to say that Aristotle’s criterion in I.7
is slightly more restrictive than his core notion of self-sufficiency—in that it rules
out activities that exhibit a high degree of independence from externals but do not
make our lives ones worth choosing. This would not affect Aristotle’s substantive
conception of happiness: a life of simple pleasures would in any case be ruled out
by his function argument. Indeed, it’s probably something anyone committed
to a univocal interpretation of self-sufficiency would have to grant, given that
Aristotle does sometime speak of the self-sufficiency of beasts (Pol 1253a29),
presumably without thinking beasts have lives worth choosing. Another possible
answer would be that Aristotle simply values independent achievements, and
that in the specific case of achieving our human function, he takes the sort of
independence I’ve been describing to contribute to the choiceworthiness of our
lives. This is not something Aristotle says directly, but he plainly takes the fact
that we achieve happiness by our own means to be one of the features that make
it a noble, praiseworthy thing (cf. 1098b30ff). If this is right not all independent
activities are choiceworthy, but achieving our human function is, and part of
what makes this particular achievement choiceworthy is that we are the ones
responsible for it.
One last consideration in support of this interpretation. Commentators have
rightly noted that Aristotle takes the self-sufficiency of some good to serve as a
mark of its finality—a point which draws on Plato’s discussion of these notions in
the Philebus.47 That may seem hard to square with what I’ve said so far. For it
may seem that a good could depend on externals yet still exhibit a high degree
of finality—that is, still be a good whose value does not stem from some product
or outcome beyond itself.48 If that’s right, a good could fail to be self-sufficient
and nonetheless be final, and so self-sufficiency would be rather poor evidence
for finality. But at least as far as activities are concerned, I think we can make
46In the Philebus passage that influenced Aristotle’s treatment of happiness, Socrates presents three
criteria for the good: sufficiency, finality, and choiceworthiness. As Cooper has argued, Aristotle’s
self-sufficiency can be seen (roughly) as a combination of Socrates’ sufficiency and choiceworthiness
criteria (2003: 283). Perhaps one lesson here is that this combination comes at a cost.
47On the connection between these two criteria, see e.g. Cooper (2003), Heinaman (1988: 45),
and Lear (2004: 51–53). Aristotle makes the point most clearly at 1097b5-8 and 1176b1-7.
48A good party, for instance, might be thought to require a lot, but still not depend for its value
on some further end beyond itself. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this example and for
pressing this point.
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sense of Aristotle’s suggestion here.49 For it’s reasonable to think that activities
that are final are also self-sufficient: a final activity is not performed for the sake
of something else, and so it’s no surprise that our performing it successfully
would not depend on something external to the activity itself, like the assistance
of some cooperative good. The thought here is simply that activities which
depend on externals for their successful performance are unlikely to be final
activities, because the dependence at play often stems from our attempting, when
performing the activity, to bring about some effect or product beyond the activity
itself, for the sake of which the activity is performed. Thus activities that fail to
be self-sufficient, at least in many typical cases, will also fail to be final.
If this is right, final activities are indeed self-sufficient, and moreover self-
sufficient to the extent that they are final. Contemplation, in particular, is more
final, and thus less dependent on outcomes than other forms of virtuous activity—
and more self-sufficient as a consequence. For, in Aristotle’s words, “nothing
arises from it apart from the contemplating, whereas from practical activities we
gain more or less apart from the action” (1177b2-4).
5 Conclusion
I’ve argued in this paper that the notion of self-sufficiency Aristotle invokes in
his ethical works is best understood as a form of independence, in our activities,
from external goods. We depend on some of these goods as preconditions for
our happiness: though they do not make us happy on their own, we need them
to act virtuously and avoid an outright miserable fate. We depend on others as
goods that cooperate with us in our activity: they play a role analogous to that
of a craftsman’s tools, assisting us in our virtuous endeavors and ensuring they
succeed unimpeded, and contribute to our happiness as much as they might.
Virtuous activities often have many preconditions, and our need for these
preconditions does set a limit on our self-sufficiency. But any human activity will
depend on preconditions of some sort. What’s distinctive about virtuous activity
is that, once the preconditions are in place, its successful unfolding depends on
us more than fortuitous circumstances or further cooperative goods. We need
material goods for dice-throwing, just as we do for virtuous activity, but success at
dice does not depend on the dice thrower in the way successful virtuous activity
depends on the virtuous individual. For the morally virtuous individual will
know how to act in a variety of circumstances, and how to reliably achieve her
ends—something she does better unimpeded, and with the right tools, but which
49This is therefore one place where it seems to me important to think of eudaimonia as an
activity rather than some collection of goods.
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ultimately depends on her practical wisdom rather than these tools or her general
good fortune.
The philosopher exhibits this independence most of all: contemplation has
few prerequisites, and, as a purely noetic exercise which does not seek to bring
about some outcome distinct from itself, depends least on good fortune or the
assistance of external cooperative goods. Thus contemplation “on its own,”
unassisted and with minimal reliance on externals, makes our life “lacking in
nothing,” that is, lacking in no further good, independent of our contemplative
activity itself, that would be needed to make our life count as a flourishing human
life. It’s in this sense, I suggest, that we should understand Aristotle’s claim
that eudaimonia is self-sufficient, and contemplation most self-sufficient form of
virtuous activity.50
50An early version of this paper was presented at UT Austin for the 35th Annual Ancient
Philosophy Workshop. I am grateful to its members, and David J. Riesbeck in particular, for their
helpful questions and comments. Thanks also to Rusty Jones and Gisela Striker for their guidance
and encouragement, and to two anonymous reviewers, whose detailed feedback led to a number of
significant improvements.
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